The Resolute Reading and Its Critics:
An Introduction to the Literature

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Abstract. This paper provides an introduction to the literature on the so-called “resolute reading” of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. It (1) places the resolute reading in its historical and dialectical context, (2) discusses the differences between the main variants of the resolute reading, (3) surveys the main objections that have been mounted against the resolute reading, as well as the replies that have been given by resolute readers, (4) examines the so-called “elucidatory” readings of the *Tractatus*, which purport to occupy a middle ground between resolute and traditional readings, and (5) provides an extensive bibliography of the literature that engages explicitly with the resolute reading.

1. Introduction

More than twenty years have elapsed since Cora Diamond and James Conant first presented what would later be called the “resolute reading” of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. Since then, their reading has been the topic of intense debate among Wittgenstein’s scholars, and has generated a large body of literature, to which this paper is intended as a brief introduction. My aim here is not to adjudicate the debate, or even to take sides in it, but rather merely to provide a map of the territory in order to facilitate progress in the debate, by preventing mutual misunderstandings and undesirable repetition as it proceeds.²

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¹ A version of this paper appeared in Italian in Conant and Diamond 2010: 269-297.
² This paper is followed by a bibliography of the literature on the resolute reading. In
2. The resolute reading in its historical context

The main advocates of the “resolute reading” are Cora Diamond and James Conant, who began to elaborate it in the late Eighties. The earliest outline of the reading appeared in an essay by Cora Diamond, “Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the *Tractatus*”, which was first published in 1988 and then collected in the seminal volume by the same author, *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind* (Diamond 1991a). In the same years, Conant began to publish his papers on the *Tractatus*, while he was still a doctoral candidate at Harvard. That was also the time when Diamond and Conant started a lasting relationship of intellectual collaboration, which issued only occasionally in co-authored works (Conant and Diamond 2004), but is explicitly acknowledged by both authors (Conant 2001a: 104; Diamond 2001: 110).

During the Nineties, the resolute reading gave rise to an intense debate among Wittgenstein scholars, eliciting a wide range of responses from strong criticisms to round endorsements. I will discuss in detail the criticisms to the resolute reading in § 4. As for the endorsements, Conant has recently listed the following authors as resolute readers (in addition, of course, to himself and Diamond): Kevin Cahill, Alice Crary, Ed Dain, Rob Deans, Piergiorgio Donatelli, Burton Dreben, Juliet Floyd, Warren Goldfarb, Logi Gunnarsson, Martin Gustafsson, Michael Kremer, Oskari Kuusela, Thomas Ricketts, Rupert Read, Matt Ostrow and Ed Witherspoon (Conant 2007: 111, note 3). To that list,
we can add Phil Hutchinson and Denis McManus. Also noteworthy in this connection are the late essays of Gordon Baker (collected in the posthumous Baker 2004). In these Baker rejects some of the central tenets of the influential interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that he had developed in collaboration with Peter Hacker during the previous decades, and comes to agree with some claims that play a central role in the resolute reading. Finally, a sustained engagement and a significant convergence with the resolute reading can also be found in last two books of Aldo Giorgio Gargani (Gargani 2003, 2008). Even if we abstract from its exegetical and philosophical merits, it seems fair to say that the resolute reading has occupied a central position in the Wittgenstein scholarship of the last two decades; a fact reflected in how many of the introductions to Wittgenstein’s philosophy published of late contain detailed discussions of the resolute reading, even when their authors are in sharp disagreement with it (cf. Stern 2004; Nordmann 2005; White 2006).

The term “resolute reading” was introduced by Thomas Ricketts, and first used in print by Warren Goldfarb in his review of The Realistic Spirit (Goldfarb 1997). It refers to the way in which, according to Conant and Diamond, we should read the penultimate section of the Tractatus, which states: “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understand me finally recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)” (TLP 1922: 6.54; amended translation). According to Conant and Diamond, this remark is interpreted in an “irresolute” way whenever a reader thinks that the elucidatory propositions of the Tractatus, even though “strictly speaking” nonsensical, are nonetheless capable of conveying ineffable insights into the nature of
reality, thought, and language. An irresolute reader, in other words, admits that the propositions of the *Tractatus* must be eventually recognized as nonsensical, but then *chickens out* (to use a colorful expression of Cora Diamond; see Diamond 1991a: 181) and claims that they serve to communicate some special sort of content. A “resolute” reading of 6.54, in contrast, is one which maintains that the sentences that compose the body of the text must be recognized to be *simply* nonsensical — i.e. seen as string of words that convey no content whatsoever.

Although “resolute reading” is the term most commonly used in the literature to refer to such interpretations, several other labels have also been employed. Some critics, for example, have argued that terms such as “resolute” and “irresolute” have implicit moral connotations that hinder a dispassionate adjudication of the debate, and suggest that each side should be identified by means of a more neutral expression (Stern 2004: 44-45). Sharing this dissatisfaction with the term “resolute reading”, several scholars have opted for the label “therapeutic reading” (McGinn 1999; Hutto 2003; White 2006), a title intended to track Conant and Diamond's view that in his early work, just as much in his later, Wittgenstein did not aim to construct philosophical theories, but rather only to provide us with tools for dissolving philosophical problems. Other commentators have referred to the resolute reading as the “austere reading” (Williams 2004), in order to emphasize the importance of its commitment to attributing to the *Tractatus* an “austere” conception of nonsense: one according to which there is, from the point of view of logic, only one kind of nonsense, that is strings of signs that fail to express any content because of a failure on our part to assign them a determinate meaning. This “austere” conception is opposed to a “substantial” conception of nonsense, under which it is claimed that in
addition to austere (mere) nonsense there is a second, more philosophically interesting, kind of nonsense: the nonsense that arises when a proposition, in virtue of the meanings that *have* been assigned to its constitutive parts, transgresses the criteria specified by a theory of meaning, and thus manages to express a logically illegitimate kind of content.³ Other critics have referred to the interpretation championed by Conant and Diamond as the “nihilist reading” (Emilianı 2003; Stern 2004) or the “postmodern reading” (Hacker 2000). And, finally, some have referred to it as the “new reading” (Proops 2001; Krebs 2001).

This last label merits a brief commentary, so that we can reach an adequate representation of the historical connections of the resolute reading. The label is mainly due to the title of an influential collection of essays, *The New Wittgenstein* (Crary and Read 2000), which played an important role in the dissemination of the resolute reading and in its own consolidation as a canon of texts and authors. It is noteworthy, however, that the essays on the *Tractatus* occupy only the second part of this collection: the first half being made up of essays on later Wittgenstein. Of particular importance, among these, are the pieces by John McDowell and Stanley Cavell. Their papers, however, could hardly be defined as “new” at the time of the publication of the collection, since the essay by McDowell was first published in 1981 (McDowell 1981), and the book from which the piece by Cavell was extracted was originally published in 1979 (Cavell 1979), and developed themes that the author had begun to articulate in print in the early 1960s.⁴ So, while it might be appropriate to refer to the resolute reading of the *Tractatus* (as

³ The terms “austere” and “substantial” conception of nonsense are Conant’s. For a detailed discussion, see Conant 2002a.
⁴ See especially Cavell 1962.
developed by Diamond and Conant since the end of the 1980s) as a “new reading” of that work, we should keep in mind that it has its roots—as suggested by the structure of the collection mentioned above—in an approach to later Wittgenstein which had already been around for several decades.

Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that Diamond and Conant have tried to do with the *Tractatus* what Stanley Cavell had done with the *Philosophical Investigations*. Cavell had maintained that we cannot understand the *Investigations* unless we fully recognize the importance of the particular conception of the nature of philosophical problems that it embraces—a conception according to which philosophy is not a constructive discipline (on the model of the natural sciences), but rather an activity that can be called “therapeutic” because it aims at the dissolution of intellectual difficulties in which we find ourselves entangled as the result of philosophical reflection. If the goal of philosophy is to give us “knowledge”, this is not knowledge of empirical facts or metaphysical super-facts, but knowledge of *ourselves*—of our tendency to fall into certain forms of illusion of meaning, and to imagine that a philosophical perspective permits us to evade the responsibility that we have for the way in which we speak and act. As Diamond writes, “[f]or Cavell a theme has been how Wittgenstein’s writing on language brings to attention our responsibility for our words, for meaning what we say, and the connection of Wittgenstein’s methods, therefore, with understanding ourselves” (Diamond 2001: 114). Conant and Diamond maintain that this conception of the nature and aims of philosophy is already present in the *Tractatus* (which is not to say that they deny the presence of important discontinuities between early and later Wittgenstein: their

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5 For an explicit acknowledgement of their deep debt to the Stanley Cavell, see Conant 2001a: 102, and Diamond 2001: 108.
thesis, as we shall see below, is rather that the real discontinuities in Wittgenstein’s thought can only be grasped against the background of a full understanding of its continuities). In analogy to what Cavell had claimed about the *Investigations*, Conant and Diamond have maintained that we cannot understand the *Tractatus* unless we take into full account the specific conception of philosophy to which the book is committed.

There are therefore important connections between the resolute reading of the *Tractatus* and previous readings of later Wittgenstein. (As a matter of fact, the resolute reading, in virtue of these connections, has contributed to a renewal of interest in that sort of approach to later Wittgenstein.\(^6\)) There are also, however, some connections between the resolute reading and previous interpretations of the *Tractatus*. Conant, for example, has written that “various strands of extant resolute readings are anticipated in the writings of […] Hidé Ishiguro, Brian McGuinness, Rush Rhees, and Peter Winch” (Conant 2007: 112, note 4).\(^7\) Diamond agrees, adding that her interpretation of the *Tractatus* was influenced by Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe. This last comment might be surprising, since the interpretations of the *Tractatus* developed by Geach and Anscombe—as we are going to see in a moment—are among the primary targets of resolute readers. However, Diamond claims that her understanding of Wittgenstein’s (“austere”) conception of nonsense, which is central to the resolute reading, is indebted to one of Anscombe’s essays, “The Reality of the Past” (Anscombe 1950). Furthermore, Diamond writes that she found Geach’s essay, “Saying and Showing in Frege and

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\(^6\) It seems accurate to say that during the 1980s the scholarship on Wittgenstein was dominated by the interpretations advanced by Michael Dummett, Saul Kripke, and Crispin Wright, according to which Wittgenstein’s writings, both early and late, aim to construe (at least when they are at their best) some kind of theory of meaning.

\(^7\) See especially Rhees 1966; Ishiguro 1969; Winch 1969; McGuinness 1981.
“Wittgenstein” (Geach 1976), particularly helpful as she “tried to see how to read the *Tractatus* and to understand what Wittgenstein was doing in calling his own remarks nonsense” (Diamond 2001: 109-110). In a similar vein, Conant writes that “though neither Peter Geach nor Elizabeth Anscombe could possibly be counted as resolute readers, their writings contain accounts of certain lines of ‘thought’ […] that anticipate themes that later become central in the writings of resolute readers” (Conant 2007: 111-112, note 4).

We should now turn to the dialectical context in which the resolute reading has been developed. The main polemical target of Diamond and Conant’s work, at least in its initial phase, was the so-called “traditional” or “ineffabilistic” reading. According to the account provided by resolute readers, the fundamental assumption of this family of interpretations is that the “nonsensical” propositions of the *Tractatus* are supposed to communicate, or to facilitate the communication of, a set of necessary truths—truths that, given the criteria for meaningfulness (putatively) laid down by the *Tractatus* itself, turn out to be strictly speaking nonsensical. The goal of the book, according to this approach, is to articulate and communicate a (special kind of) theory: the reader is intended to grasp a body of doctrines that cannot be *said* but only *shown*. (This sort of interpretation, therefore, avails itself of a particular understanding of the distinction between *saying* and *showing* which appears in the *Tractatus* and in other writings of the same time.) In response to the fact that, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein explicitly notes that “philosophy is not a doctrine but an activity” (TLP 1922: 4.112), “traditional” readings claim that this remark should be understood in the light of a technical notion of “theory” and “doctrine”,

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8 For Diamond’s acknowledged indebtedness to Anscombe’s *Introduction* to the *Tractatus* (Anscombe 1959), see Diamond 2003a, 2004a, and forthcoming, b.
according to which only that which can be expressed by means of factual contingent propositions (i.e., by means of what the Tractatus calls sinnvolle Sätze, “meaningful propositions”) can be counted as a doctrine or theory. Thus, it can be maintained that in this limited, technical sense the Tractatus is not putting forth any doctrine, because the contents that it seeks to convey cannot be expressed in “meaningful propositions”, but can only be communicated by means of propositions that the book classifies as “nonsensical” (unsinnige). According to the resolute readers, this sort of interpretation was inaugurated by Anscombe’s Introduction to the Tractatus (Anscombe 1959) and has occupied a dominant position in scholarship on the work ever since. Michael Kremer, for example, lists the following works as main representatives of the ineffabilistic tradition (Kremer 2007: 164, note 2): Anscombe 1959, Hacker 1972, Kenny 1973, Geach 1976, Fogelin 1976, Pears 1987, McGuinness 1988, Monk 1990, Stern 1995, Glock 1996, Stokhof 2002, and Monk 2005.

The resolute reading has also another polemical target, historically more remote, but equally important from a philosophical perspective: the neo-positivist interpretations of the Tractatus, which were dominant in the 1930s and 1940s (cf. especially Carnap 1932, 1934a, 1934b). These interpretations reject with great emphasis the idea of ineffable contents that cannot be said but only shown, as well as the idea of a peculiar kind of nonsense which manages to convey some sort of content. The Tractatus ends by urging that “[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”. Proponents of the neo-positivist reading and ineffabilist readers understand this concluding remark in radically different ways. For the latter group of readers, Wittgenstein is alluding to a kind of silence that is, so to speak, saturated with understanding: the silence of a person who
has grasped “that which can only be shown”, and, as a result of recognizing its ineffability, has definitively given up any attempt to express it in meaningful propositions. For the former sort of reader, on the other hand, Wittgenstein’s remark refers to a kind silence that is completely empty: either we speak in full voice, by using meaningful propositions (sinvolle Sätze) and their limiting cases, i.e. tautologies and contradictions (sinnlose Sätze), or else we fall into mere nonsense (einfach Unsinn), which neither say nor show anything whatsoever.

At first glance, therefore, it might seem that there is a significant continuity between the neo-positivist interpretations and the resolute reading. According to the advocates of the resolute reading, however, this appearance is deceptive. This is because for the neo-positivists, the Tractatus is a straightforwardly theoretical book: its aim is to articulate a theory of meaning that draws the bounds of sense, and which can thus be used to sort out meaningful propositions from nonsensical pseudo-propositions. The saying/showing distinction, according to their account, is an infelicitous device to which Wittgenstein appeals in order to get around a difficulty that can actually be solved in a much simpler and unproblematic way. The difficulty is that the Tractatus appears to run into a paradoxical self-refutation: it seems that the propositions of the book fail to satisfy the criteria of meaningfulness that the book itself lays down. Neo-positivist readers take Wittgenstein's use of the saying/showing distinction to be a way of persuading himself that he can simply live with the paradox: he claims that his own propositions are “nonsensical”, and maintains that the theory of meaning which the book aims to articulated cannot be “said” but only “shown”. However, this paradox is easily solvable by going meta-linguistic: in order to avoid it, we simply need to rephrase the propositions
of the *Tractatus* as propositions belonging to the meta-language, describing the structure of the object language. Once this solution is adopted, it is claimed, there is no need to classify the propositions of the *Tractatus* as “nonsensical”, and 6.54, accordingly, can be simply ignored.

This is, in substance, an elaboration of the suggestion made by Bertrand Russell in his introduction to the *Tractatus* (TLP 1922: xxiii), which, notably, Wittgenstein thoroughly rejected. According to advocates of the resolute reading, the neo-positivist approach misses fundamental aspects of the thought of early Wittgenstein, such as the fact that the *Tractatus* is not interested to discuss any particular language, but language (and thought) *as such*. Moreover, by attributing to the *Tractatus* a theory of meaning, the neo-positivist interpretations end up assuming a substantial conception of nonsense—thus converging, on this point, with the ineffabilistic interpretations. This is because the kind of nonsense that arises from the transgression of the theory of meaning putatively specified by the *Tractatus* is assumed to be quite different from *mere* nonsense: it is supposed to consist in syntactic constructions that turn out to be nonsensical *in virtue of* the meanings that have been assigned to their constituent parts, whereas mere nonsense arises when a string of words does not convey any content because we have not assigned them any determinate meaning. As a matter of fact, therefore, the neo-positivist readings share ineffabilist readers’ commitment to the idea that some nonsensical propositions express “illogical thoughts”. This leads some advocates of the resolute reading to conclude that the neo-positivist interpretations are intrinsically unstable: on the one hand, they purport to reject any “communicative” or “substantial” conception of nonsense (and if they really did so, they would end up coinciding with the resolute reading); but, on the
other hand, by attributing to the *Tractatus* a theory of meaning, they assume *de facto* a substantial conception of nonsense (and so end up converging with the ineffabilist reading).\(^9\)

3. Varieties of resolute readings

Several resolute readers have stressed that it is to a certain extent misleading to speak of *the* resolute reading of the *Tractatus*. Such a label, in fact, is appropriate only when it is understood to designate a *general program* for developing actual readings of the book. Their idea is that there is a set of commitments that suffice to sort out resolute readings from irresolute ones, but that adherence to this set nonetheless leaves room for a variety of ways of developing detailed interpretations of the work —and thus for a variety of resolute readings (cf. Read and Deans 2003; Conant and Diamond 2004; Conant 2006).

Conant and Diamond, for instance, have maintained that a reading of the *Tractatus* qualifies as “resolute” if it subscribes to the following three interrelated commitments:

1) The propositions of the book that the reader is asked to recognize as nonsensical do not convey ineffable insights;

2) No theory of meaning is advanced in the book, and no such theory is required to achieve the aforementioned recognition;

\(^9\) For a detail discussion of the relations between the resolute reading and the neo-positivist interpretations, see Witherspoon 2000, Conant 2001c, 2002a. For a criticism of the way in which resolute readers construe the neo-positivist interpretations, see Hacker 2003; for a rejoinder, see Diamond 2005a.
3) The book rejects any substantial conception of nonsense.

As Conant and Diamond emphasize, these commitments—which are mostly negative in nature—leave room for a considerable range of divergence in our understanding of the *Tractatus*, and, in fact, specify a programmatic approach to interpretation which, as yet, does not determine, in detail, the concrete exegeses and interpretations which can be developed from it. (Conant and Diamond 2004: 43-44).

Insistence on this point of the looseness of the resolute reading as a program for interpretation and understanding of the *Tractatus*, moreover, springs from more than mere contemplation of abstract possibilities. It is reinforced by the fact that considerable disagreements between resolute readers began to emerge as the debate over it progressed.

The main internal division among resolute readers is between “Girondin” and “Jacobin” readers (cf. Goldfarb 2011)—or, more or less equivalently, between “weak resolutism” and “strong resolutism” (cf. Read and Deans 2003; Read 2006). The main advocates of the former approach are Conant and Diamond themselves, whereas the latter approach is mainly represented by Juliet Floyd, Rupert Read and Robert Deans. The core of their disagreement concerns the ideas of a canon of analysis and of a completely perspicuous logical notation.

According to Conant and Diamond, these ideas are operative in the method of clarification employed by the *Tractatus*. Moreover, they encapsulate a whole metaphysics of language, to which early Wittgenstein was unwittingly committed, and which later Wittgenstein gradually came to detect and reject. It is important to be clear, however, about the reasons why Conant and Diamond believe that the two aforementioned ideas
constitute a problematic aspect of the *Tractatus*. The problem is not that a perspicuous logical notation works in the *Tractatus* as a mechanical device for determining whether our propositions are meaningful or nonsensical. Any such account of the role of a logical notation—which is characteristic of the neo-positivist interpretations—must assume a substantial conception of nonsense and is therefore incompatible with the resolute approach. For Conant and Diamond, the *Tractatus* rather assigns to a *Begriffsschrift* the function of a *clarificatory tool*. By using a *Begriffsschrift*, we can present the potential victim of a philosophical confusion with different ways of meaning the words that she wants to use, each one being clearly distinguishable from the others. Our interlocutor can then accept one of these “translations” as an accurate rendering of what she wanted to say, or, alternatively, she may come to recognize that she was hovering indeterminately between different options, without decisively meaning any one in particular. In the latter case, the person should come to realize that there was *nothing at all* that she wanted to say. On this view, the role of a *Begriffsschrift* in the *Tractatus* is that of a tool for achieving clarity about what we want to do with our words; it is instrument (to borrow a helpful expression from Warren Goldfarb; 1997: 71) for “interrogating our sentences,” or even better, for interrogating our relationship to our sentences. The problem that Conant and Diamond see in this approach, however, is that the *Tractatus* assumes that there must be a *completely* clear way of rewriting our sentences, one which makes clear the entirety of their inferential relations, and thereby assigns them a determinate place within what the *Tractatus* calls “*the* logical space”—the homogeneous and immutable realm of all possible meanings.

The Jacobins, on the other hand, argue that the idea of a canon of analysis and the
idea of an absolutely perspicuous logical notation—as well as all their philosophical implications—are themselves only rungs of the ladder which the reader of the *Tractatus* is finally supposed to throw away (cf. especially Floyd 2002: 338-341). According to this second group, the assumption of the possibility of an absolutely perspicuous logical notation inevitably involves the assumption of something like *the* logical structure of language—a structure that cannot be described, but only exhibited or “mirrored” by an appropriate symbolism. Thus, they claim, by attributing to the *Tractatus* any such view, one falls back into an ineffabilist reading.

For the Jacobins, the reading proposed by Diamond and Conant is “something of a retreat” from the resolute approach, in the direction of the opposite camp (Read 2006: 81). For the Girondins, on the other hand, the putative radicalism of the Jacobin variant renders “impossible” the already difficult task of providing an adequate account of the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thought (Conant 2006: 204; I’ll come back on these issues in § 4.3).

4. Criticisms of the resolute reading

I should warn that this list should not be taken to suggest that there exists a group of commentators who agree in all respects on their criticisms of the resolute program, and who share a single understanding of what a non-resolute, “traditional” reading should look like. As a matter of fact, the list includes commentators who think that the resolute reading should be rejected more or less in toto (such as Hacker), as well as more sympathetic commentators (such as Sullivan, McGinn, Hutto and Emiliani), who argue that the resolute reading is wrong about some issues, but should also be granted (at least in some of its variants) some significant merits. Moreover, the positive interpretations proposed by the critics of the resolute reading are at least as varied as the different existing attempts to carry out the resolute program.

I will now proceed thematically, discussing the main criticisms that have been advanced by the collection of authors mentioned above, and specifying, as we proceed, the source for these in particular works. Wherever possible, I will also indicate the replies to these criticisms that have been offered by resolute readers. A potential disadvantage of this procedure is to create an artificial and distorted picture of the internal development of the resolute reading—as if resolute readers were continuously adding clauses and caveats to their views for no better reason than having something to say in response to the criticisms that they receive. The reader should thus keep in view, however, the fact that the “replies” that I will discuss below bear a much more organic relation to the positive articulation of the resolute reading. Many of them were included, at least embryonically, in the original presentations of the relevant variants of the resolute reading, and merely needed to be re-stated in response to criticisms; and even when developments to the various resolute readings have been occasioned by accurate criticism, they can be seen,
when properly examined, to be part of the attempt to think through and spell out what was already implicit in their fundamental commitments.

4.1 The saying/showing distinction

As we have seen, one of the distinctive features of the resolute reading is its rejection of the idea that the aim of the *Tractatus* is to bring us to grasp a substantial body of philosophical doctrines which cannot be *said* but only *shown* – doctrines concerning, say, the necessary structure of language, mind and reality. According to the resolute reading, the saying/showing distinction, under this ineffabilistic construal, is just one of the rungs of the Tractarian ladder that we must eventually throw away (cf. especially Conant 1991, 2002a). A number of critics, however, have claimed that this is a perverse reading of Wittgenstein’s book. John Koethe, for example, has argued that the saying/showing distinction is the very *heart* of the *Tractatus* (Koethe 2003); Peter Hacker has pointed out that, in a letter to Russell, early Wittgenstein describes the saying/showing distinction as nothing less then the “cardinal problem of philosophy” (Hacker 2000: 273); and to throw away this distinction is, according to Roger White, “to throw away the baby with the bathwater” (White 2011).

Several critics, moreover, have argued that resolute readers give a distorted construal of the ineffabilistic interpretation of the *Tractatus*. On this construal, the traditional reading claims that the sentences of the *Tractatus* that the reader must finally recognize as nonsensical *show what cannot be said*. But, it is objected, this is a coarse mistake that no well-informed traditional interpreter actually commits. Every competent
scholar of the *Tractatus* knows, in fact, that according to the book only meaningful propositions (*sinvolle Sätze*) and their limiting cases, i.e. tautologies and contradictions (*sinnlose Sätze*), *show* something; nonsensical propositions (*unsinnige Sätze*) neither say nor show anything. Thus, good traditional interpretations of the work maintain that the point of the *Tractatus* is to convey *what is shown* by *sinvolle* and *sinnlose* Sätze, by leading the reader to appreciate that the propositions of the *Tractatus* are merely nonsensical—i.e., sentences that neither say nor show anything (Mounce 2001; Emiliani 2003; Cheung 2008; White 2011).

The first point to note about the response that resolute readers have given to these objections, is that they are not committed to rejecting the saying/showing distinction *as such*, but only the ineffabilistic construal of this distinction: that under which we think of “what is shown” as some kind of quasi-propositional content, as if “showing” were a funny kind of “saying”. The *Tractatus*, according to Diamond, Conant and other resolute readers, actually invites us to understand the notion of “what can only be shown” in this way, but only as “a rung of the latter” that must be ultimately thrown away. Michael Kremer has stressed the significance of the fact that Wittgenstein, in the letter to Russell quoted by Hacker, refers to the saying/showing distinction as “the cardinal problem of philosophy” (Kremer 2007). Problems of philosophy, as the *Tractatus* conceives them, are confusions that must be overcome. For resolute readers, then, the ineffabilist construal of the saying/showing distinction is one of the confusions that the *Tractatus* attacks and tries to dissolve. Moreover, the traditional readings of the *Tractatus* remain problematic even when they avoid the mistake of attributing the capacity for showing to the nonsensical propositions of the *Tractatus*. The problem, in fact, is that they continue
to construe “what can only be shown” as a quasi-propositional content.

For at least some resolute readers, there is room for a redeemed understanding of the saying/showing distinction, which we are not meant to throw away. Diamond has written that the difficulty here is to make the distinction between saying and showing deep enough—to stop thinking of showing on the model of saying. Michael Kremer has provided a positive elaboration of Diamond’s suggestion, arguing that we should rather conceive the saying/showing distinction on the model of the distinction introduced by Gilbert Ryle between knowing-that and knowing-how (Kremer 2001, 2007; see also Conant and Diamond 2004, and Diamond forthcoming, a). Peter Sullivan, a relatively sympathetic critic, has approved of this “resolute” elaboration of the saying/showing distinction, but has also argued that it threatens to blur the distinction between the resolute reading and the best versions of the traditional reading (Sullivan 2002).

4.2 The therapeutic aim of the Tractatus

A number of critics concede that it is an advantage of the resolute reading that it provides a pretty straightforward interpretation of proposition 6.54, and also of the meta-philosophical remarks contained in the body of the book. Nonetheless, they claim that the overall textual evidence does not suffice to show that the aim of the Tractatus is limited to therapy, to the exclusion of any positive theory-building. Admittedly, in the Preface, Wittgenstein writes that his book is not a Lehrbuch, a word that resolute readers are sometimes fond of translating as “book of doctrine”. Their critics, however, claim that this is an over-literal translation: in their view, Wittgenstein says that the Tractatus is not
a *textbook* simply because of the special status and difficulty of the doctrines that it contains. Moreover, they note, in the Preface Wittgenstein also writes that the value of the book consists in the fact that “the *truth* of the thoughts communicated” in it is “unassailable and definitive”. And, finally, the penultimate section of the book itself—the section on which the resolute reading places such insistent emphasis—tells us that the reader, after having climbed and thrown away the ladder, will “see the world aright”.

Taken together, these remarks have seemed to some to suggest that the author of the *Tractatus* does aim to communicate a body of doctrine, but that these doctrines are meant to have a special status, different from that of scientific theories and empirical descriptions of the world (Hacker 2000; Proops 2001).

To my knowledge, the most direct replies to these textual objections have been given by Michael Kremer. Kremer argues that the kind of “truth” that the *Tractatus* aims to communicate is radically different from the kind of truth that belongs to a doctrine—effable or ineffable. As in the case of the saying/showing distinction, the difficulty here is to make the distinction between these two kinds of truths *deep enough*—to stop thinking of the truth that the *Tractatus* wants to communicate on the model of the truth that belongs to empirical descriptions of the world (Kremer 2001).

### 4.3 The evolution of Wittgenstein’s philosophy

If the *Tractatus* does not purport to put forth any philosophical thesis, then how can we account for the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thought? More specifically, how can we account for the many passages contained in the writings of later Wittgenstein where he
criticizes some philosophical thesis and attributes it, explicitly or implicitly, to the author of the Tractatus? The resolute reading, according to some prominent commentators, is committed to a radical continuity thesis—“there is only one Wittgenstein engaged in therapy throughout his career”—that simply flies in the face of textual evidence (Marconi 1997, Hacker 2000, Proops 2001, Williams 2004).

The account of the evolution of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a topic where the differences between the two main variants of resolute reading become crucial. I will here focus on the reply provided by the “Girondin” variant of resolute reading, championed by Conant and Diamond; if they are right, the main problem with the opposite, “Jacobin” variant of resolute reading is precisely its incapacity to tell a plausible story about the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thought.

The account provided by Conant and Diamond hinges on the distinction between two different kinds of metaphysics present “within” the Tractatus: on the one hand, there is the “ironic” or “transitional” metaphysics that Wittgenstein self-consciously includes in the Tractatus, which is meant to be thrown away at the end; and on the other, there is the unwitting metaphysics that slipped into the Tractatus in spite of the author’s best intentions. Wittgenstein’s authorial intent was to avoid any metaphysical thesis and to equip us with a number of clarificatory tools that, by harnessing our ordinary capacity to distinguish what makes sense from what doesn’t, could help us to overcome philosophical confusions. But he did not quite succeed in carrying out his aim. As we saw in § 3, Conant and Diamond maintain that the method of clarification of the Tractatus incorporates a substantial metaphysics of language. The method of the Tractatus involves a number of dogmatic assumptions (connected to a certain ideal of analysis and
perspicuity) that the early Wittgenstein could not recognize as such, but which later Wittgenstein gradually came to acknowledge and criticize. Thus, there is no unresolvable tension in Conant and Diamond's both stressing the strong continuity in the therapeutic intent of early and later Wittgenstein, while claiming that the Tractatus nonetheless contains a set of substantive philosophical theses that are exposed and criticized by later Wittgenstein (Diamond 1991a: 8-22, 2004b; Conant and Diamond 2004: 80-7; Conant 2006, 2007; cf. also Kuusela 2008b, 2011).

It is worth mentioning here that Conant and Diamond regard Wittgenstein's writings from the Thirties as belonging to a crucial transitional phase in his thought. They claim that although he begun to unravel and unmask the unwitting metaphysical commitments of the Tractatus as soon as he returned to philosophy in 1929, Wittgenstein continued for several years to pursue the ideal of a single method of clarification. In the late Thirties, however, he came to single out this very ideal as the central locus of philosophical dogmatism in his previous thought. Wittgenstein came to see that the very idea that all philosophical problems can be dissolved, in principle, by applying a single method of clarification presupposes that it is possible to specify in advance the structure of philosophical problems. This leads to the view that the illusion of sense—as well as the meaningful use of language—must have a certain structure, namely the structure that makes it possible to apply our method of clarification. The search for a single method of clarification came, then, to be viewed by Wittgenstein as the obstacle that prevents us from looking at the real range and variety of our uses of language and from attending to

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10 Conant draws attention to this passage from 1931: “The nimbus of philosophy has been lost. For we now have a method of doing philosophy, and can speak of skilful philosophers. Compare the difference between alchemy and chemistry; chemistry has a method and we can speak of skilful chemists” (LWL 1980: 21).
the specificity of the various problems that we encounter in the course of philosophizing. Thus, according to Conant and Diamond, if we wish to speak of a “turn” in Wittgenstein’s thought, we shouldn’t date it to 1929 (as is commonly done), but rather to around 1936-37, when Wittgenstein moved to a new perspective under which there is assumed to be no single method of philosophy (cf. PI 1953: 133), but rather only an open series of different method that can be extended, to use Conant’s expression, in both “unforeseen and unforeseeable ways” (Diamond 2004b; Conant 2007: 140-142, notes 135, 136; Conant 2010 and forthcoming; Kremer 2007: 163, 164; Kuusela 2008b: 120-132).

4.4 The “frame” and the “body” of the *Tractatus*

The resolute reading appeals to a distinction between the propositions of the *Tractatus* that serve as elucidations, which are supposed to be thrown away (the “body” of the book), and the propositions that provide the instructions on how to read the book, which are *not* meant to be thrown away (its “frame”). But which propositions actually belong to the body and which to the frame? And is there any independent criterion for deciding whether a particular proposition of the *Tractatus* belongs to the one or the other?

According to some critics, the distinction appears to be fairly clear in Conant’s and Diamond’s early writings, which suggest that the frame is composed by the Preface and the conclusion, and the body is composed by *all* the other propositions. But on closer inspection, we can see that a resolute reader needs to draw on many propositions from the middle of the book in order to give some plausibility to her interpretation. A resolute
reader, for instance, will typically appeal to the propositions that articulate the austere conception of nonsense and the context principle (the 5.73's and the 3.3's respectively), to the propositions that describe the role of a proper logical notion (the 3.32's), and to the propositions that discuss the nature of philosophy (the early 4's) in making her case. It seems that for resolute readers these propositions are not transitional and are not meant to be thrown away. Critics object, at this point, that the distinction between the body and the frame appears to be totally arbitrary: it seems to them that resolute readers simply include in the frame all and only those propositions of the book that support their own interpretation (Proops 2001; Sullivan 2002).

Conant’s response to this charge, which has been further elaborated by Kremer, is that the distinction between the body and the frame of the work cannot be drawn in purely spacial terms. Whether a given remark belongs to the frame or to the body of the work depends on the use that the reader makes of it. A proposition belongs to the frame if it survives the elucidatory process of the *Tractatus*—i.e. if the reader, at the end of the process, is still able to recognize in that proposition a determinate sense (Conant 2002a: 457-458, note 135; Kremer 2001: 41-43).

4.5 The elucidatory function of Tractarian nonsense

The resolute reading insists that the propositions composing the body of the book should be recognized as nonsensical in an “austere” sense of the term, i.e. as strings of words that, from a logical point of view, are equivalent to mere gibberish. At the same time, however, resolute readers maintain that such propositions should serve as “elucidations”
that transform the reader and eventually lead her to see the formulations of philosophical problems, as well as their attempted solutions, as mere confusion. But now, how can a piece of “austere” nonsense (which, as resolute readers emphasize, is logically equivalent to mere gibberish) fulfill such an elucidatory function—or any other reflective function whatsoever?

The charge, here, is that the resolute reading is vitiated by an irresolvable tension: either it claims that that the elucidatory propositions of the *Tractatus* are meant to be nonsensical in the austere sense of the word—and then it is forced to the paradoxical conclusion that we may replace the sentences of the *Tractatus* with any other piece of gibberish; or it vindicates the idea that the propositions of the *Tractatus* fulfill a determinate reflective function—but in that case it needs to give up the claim that the propositions of the *Tractatus* are meant to be recognized as austerely nonsensical; and to give up such a claim would be to give up the resolute reading altogether (Hutto and Lippitt 1998; McGinn 1999; Hacker 2000: 361; Vilhauer 2003).

Resolute readers have generally anticipated this kind of objection and have included some response to it in the formulation of their interpretation. Part of the response draws on the Fregean distinction between the logical and the psychological import of words. The idea here is that while any two pieces of nonsense are identical from a logical point of view, they may nonetheless differ in their psychological meaning. The elucidatory nonsense of the *Tractatus* differs therefore psychologically—but not logically—from mere gibberish (Diamond 1991b; Conant 2002a).

But this first hint of a response, if not further elaborated, is likely to raise some perplexities. We need a more precise specification of the “psychological meaning” that
resolute readers attribute to the sentences of the *Tractatus*. For, if they reject the idea that these sentences can be replaced with any other piece of gibberish, they also reject the idea that the psychological import of these sentences can be conceived in purely causal, a-rational terms—as if the sentences of the *Tractatus* could be aptly replaced by a very studious kick in the head that brings about the same “psychological effects”. Cora Diamond has elaborated some analogies that help to prevent this construal of the relevant notion of psychological meaning. She has compared the elucidatory procedure of the *Tractatus* with impossibility proofs in mathematics and with the solution of riddles. These are forms of argument, and therefore exercises of our rational and reflective capacities; but they are also radically different from more ordinary forms of reasoning, where the sense of the various steps of the argument is fixed before we reach its conclusion. According to Diamond, the formulation of a riddle, and the steps that guide us to its solution, receive a determinate sense only when the solution is actually found; in the meanwhile, they have only a “promissory sense”. Similarly, the result of a proof of impossibility is that the starting hypothesis, as well as the various steps of the proof, had actually no determinate sense; they turn out to have had only a “transitional sense”. For Diamond, the “psychological meaning” of the elucidatory sentences of the *Tractatus* is analogous to this sort of transitional sense (Diamond 1991a: 34-35).

4.6 The austere conception of nonsense

Resolute readers not only attribute the austere conception of nonsense to the *Tractatus* (and to the later Wittgenstein), but also endorse it, explicitly or implicitly, as a correct
philosophical view. They have received, accordingly, criticisms on both exegetical and philosophical grounds.

The exegetical criticisms have tended to focus on the role that the *Tractatus* assigns to the notion of logical syntax. Peter Hacker, most notably, has argued that for the *Tractatus* a logical syntax has the role of specifying the logical types of linguistic expressions and their legitimate modes of combination. For Hacker, the *Tractatus* is clearly committed to the possibility of combining expressions belonging to unsuitable logical types, and thus to the possibility of what a resolute reader would regard as substantial nonsense (Hacker 2003; Glock 2004).

Resolute readers, however, have argued that there is no notion of logical syntax in the *Tractatus* that bears these implications. The *Tractatus* is indeed committed to the idea of a perspicuous notation that obeys the rules of logical syntax; but this is simply a notation that systematically avoids cross-category equivocations (cf. TLP 1922: 3.322-3.325). We violate the rules of logical syntax, according to this alternative reconstruction of the *Tractatus*’ view, when we use the same sign to express meanings belonging to different logical categories. This should be avoided, because it is the source of much philosophical confusion. But there is no such thing, according to the resolute interpretation of the *Tractatus*, as violating the rules of logical syntax in the sense envisioned by Hacker (see for example Diamond 1991a: 115-44; 2005a).

Moving now to the philosophical criticisms that have been mounted against the austere conception of nonsense, some critics have argued that such a view must be wrong because it depends on an overly-restrictive understanding of Frege’s context principle; one which rules out the compositionality of language and thus renders mysterious our
capacity to understand new sentences (Glock 2004). But some resolute readers—most notably Diamond and Conant—have maintained that the understanding of the context principle that entails the austere conception of nonsense does not rule out the compositionality of language as such (which would be obviously untenable), but only a particular, atomistic, construal of such compositionality (Diamond 1991a: 108-111; Conant 2002a: 432, notes 34-35, and 446-447, note 91; for a direct reply to Glock, see Dain 2008 and Bronzo 2011).

Other critics have argued that the austere conception of nonsense is incompatible with the anti-theoretical aims of the resolute reading. According to Meredith Williams, for example, insofar as we wish to speak of nonsense and to charge certain sentences with being nonsensical (no matter whether in an “austere” or “substantial” way), we need to appeal to a theory of meaning that specifies the relevant criteria of meaningfulness (Williams 2004).

However, resolute readers see this objection as expressive of a radical misunderstanding of the essence of the austere conception of nonsense. The very idea of what we might call a nonsensicality inference (whereby we deduce the nonsensicality of a sentence from the fact that it violates the criteria specified by a theory of meaning) is, for them, just another aspect of the substantial conception of nonsense. They maintain that any theory of the bounds of sense presupposes a substantial conception of nonsense, and vice versa. The austere conception of nonsense can be formulated precisely as the rejection of any such theory. So there is, in fact, no tension between the anti-theoretical aims of resolute readers and their endorsement of the austere conception of nonsense (see e.g. Conant and Diamond 2004).
Finally, there are critics who have argued that the austere conception of nonsense (regardless of whether it is actually endorsed by the author of the *Tractatus*) is untenable from the perspective of the philosophy of later Wittgenstein. Later Wittgenstein teaches us to look at the way we use our words. And if we look at the way in which we use the word “nonsense”, we will see that it enters our lives in a variety of different and variously related ways. There is therefore no real ground for insisting that there is, from a logical point of view, only one kind of nonsense (Reid 1998; Glock 2004). Lynette Reid, in particular, has argued that such a monist conception of nonsense depends on a dichotomy between logic and psychology (and on a preconceived idea of what can count as “logic”) that the philosophy of later Wittgenstein as a whole is concerned to criticize (Reid 1998).

It is worth noting, however, that Conant and Diamond are not committed to denying that the Fregean distinction between logic and psychology undergoes a radical transformation in the philosophy of later Wittgenstein; in fact, this is a central feature of their own approach to it (Diamond 1991a: 1-11; 2003b).\(^\text{11}\) It seems, then, that they can insist on the importance of this transformation, while continuing to maintain that, for both early and later Wittgenstein, there is no such thing as “a theory of meaning” that dictates which contents should count as legitimate and which contents should count as nonsensical—which is all they want to deny when they argue that there is, from a logical point of view, only one kind of nonsense.

### 4.7 The ethical aim of the *Tractatus*

\(^\text{11}\) Diamond and Conant agree on this point with Cavell, who has described the *Philosophical Investigations* as the attempt to “de-psychologize psychology” (Cavell 1962: 91).
In a famous letter to the editor Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein writes that the point of the *Tractatus* is an ethical one, and that the book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical in the only possible rigorous way, namely “from within”, by not talking about the ethical at all (CLF 1979: 94-95). This statement and some remarks that appear in the last sections of the *Tractatus*—such as the 6.522, “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical”—might be taken to provide support for the traditional interpretations of the *Tractatus*: the point of the book is to communicate a set of ineffable contents that cannot be said but can only be shown—for example, *ethical* ones.

However, some resolute readers (most notably Diamond, Donatelli, and Conant) have argued that early Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics can be correctly understood only if we avoid, at one and the same time, both the ineffabilist interpretations—which construe the sphere of the ethical as a substantive body of contents—and the earlier positivist interpretations—which according to which there are no effable or ineffable ethical contents, but only emotions of approval and disapproval that are expressed in ethical *pseudo*-propositions (Diamond 1991b, 1996, and forthcoming, a; Donatelli 1998, 2004, 2005; Conant 2005; cf. also Krebs 2001; Kremer 2001; Cahill 2004a; McManus 2006: 175-210).

While there is wide agreement among resolute readers about what ethics in *Tractatus* is not, their positive attempts to work out what ethics in the *Tractatus* actually *is* present marked differences. This is a very delicate area of the debate, to which I cannot hope to do justice here, due to constraints of space. I will simply register that according to some critics, at least some of these positive accounts (in particular that offered by
Diamond) are in tension with the austere conception of nonsense (Hutto and Lipitt 1998; Vilhauer 2003; for more recent discussions of the ethical aim of the *Tractatus* that engage critically with some resolute proposals, see Venturinha 2010 and Schneider 2011).

5. A “middle way”?

Marie McGinn and Daniel Hutto, who are among the more sympathetic critics of the resolute reading, have independently advanced a putative middle way between the “metaphysical readings” of the *Tractatus* on the on hand, and the “therapeutic readings” on the other. They agree with Conant and Diamond that the *Tractatus* does not aim to put forth a theory. In particular, they argue that the *Tractatus* does not aim to put forth a metaphysical doctrine that grounds the functioning of our language in features of an external and independent reality. However, they disagree with Conant and Diamond on the idea that the aim of the *Tractatus* is “purely therapeutic”, and on the claim that its elucidatory propositions are logically equivalent to mere gibberish. They wonder how a piece of “mere nonsense” could ever work as an elucidation (cf. above, § 4.2). The actual aim of the *Tractatus*, according to Hutto and McGinn, is to “elucidate” the functioning of our language. This process is supposed to confer to the reader a kind of understanding. And it is *this understanding* that is supposed to enable the reader to dissolve the “the problems of philosophy”. This approach, which is known as the “elucidatory” reading, purports to occupy a middle ground between resolute and traditional readings.

In order to show that such a middle ground is actually available, the advocates of the elucidatory reading must meet two fundamental challenges. They must explain, in the
first place, why a set of “elucidations” does not count after all as a philosophical theory—
not as a realist theory, perhaps, but as a theory, say, about the necessary structure of our
language. In the second place, they must provide some account of what is going on in
6.54, where Wittgenstein says—without qualification—that the propositions of his book,
in order to serve as elucidations, must be eventually recognized as nonsensical.

The strategy with which elucidatory readings address the first difficulty is also
their most characteristic feature: it consists in assimilating the status of the elucidatory
propositions of the Tractatus to the status of “grammatical remarks” in later Wittgenstein
(cf. PI 1953: 122-128). The suggestion is that the propositions of the Tractatus that fulfil
a genuinely elucidatory function are not part of a theory because they do not give us any
new information and do not express any hypothesis: rather, they simply remind us of
what we already know in virtue of the mastery that we have of our language (McGinn

As for the second difficulty, Hutto addresses it in the following way. The author
of the Tractatus wanted to provide nothing more than elucidations; but in some cases, he
fell short of his intentions: instead of “reminding us of what is obvious”, he ended up
imposing metaphysical requirements on our uses of language. Proposition 6.54,
according to Hutto, is an expression of these requirements. For him, the Tractatus, in
spite of its aspirations, remains committed to a restrictive and dogmatic conception of
what may count as a legitimate proposition; and this conception, which Wittgenstein did
not (at that time) regard as a substantive and potentially controversial piece of
philosophical theory, forced him to classify his own elucidations as “nonsensical” (Hutto
and Lippitt 1998: 274). Thus, 6.54 is not an “instruction” for reading the work that
belongs to the essence of its philosophical strategy (as resolute readers maintain), but rather a “problematic conclusion” that follows from its unintentional dogmatic assumptions (ibid.: 268). To the extent that the *Tractatus* lives up to its own aspirations, then, 6.54 can be simply ignored. There is no real need to say that the (genuine) elucidations of the book are “nonsensical”; all we have to do is attend to the specificity of their use, to the role that they play in our language. It is taken as no accident, in this connection, that later Wittgenstein felt no pressure to call his grammatical remarks “nonsensical”.

McGinn is not equally explicit about this second issue,\(^{12}\) but she seems to hold that the 6.54 is at best an infelicitous remark. According to McGinn, the elucidatory propositions are “strictly nonsensical” because they “do not express a sense”—where this appears to mean that they are nonsensical because they are neither *sinvolle* nor *sinnlose* *Sätze* (McGinn 2006: 253). Moreover, they must be “thrown away” because they do not aim to constitute a body of metaphysical knowledge, but only to fulfil an “entirely transitional” function: they serve to “[lay] bare what language itself reveals”, in order to dissolve the problems of philosophy. Once their intended aim is achieved, they can be simply “left behind” (ibid.: 252-253).

Resolute readers have responded in different ways to these proposals. Some commentators (belonging to the Jacobin camp) have argued that Hutto and McGinn end up with variants of the ineffabilist reading and fail to do justice to the specificity of the clarificatory method of the *Tractatus*, as described in the 6.54 (Read 2004; Hutchinson 2006; Read and Hutchinson 2006). Others commentators (closer to the Girondin camp)

\(^{12}\) It is remarkable, in this respect, that her recent monograph on the *Tractatus* contains only a quick and somewhat evasive discussion of 6.54 (McGinn 2006: 253-254).
have argued that it is difficult to establish a substantial difference between the elucidatory readings and the interpretation defended by Diamond and Conant (Kuusela 2007). Thus resolute readers have raised doubts from opposite directions about the possibility of any genuine “middle way” between resolute and ineffabilist readings.13

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13 I wish to thank Piergiorgio Donatelli for many helpful comments and suggestions. Any inaccuracy or mistake is of course my sole responsibility.


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